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The Tea Party and American Populism Today: 
Between Protest, Patriotism and Paranoia 
Abstract 
This article takes a closer look at the Tea Party by adding a transatlantic perspective. Its aim is to show that the 
Tea Party is a genuine right-wing movement with strong affinities to the Republican Party which revives par-
ticular American traditions of conservatism and the radical right. Its support base is not ‘the mainstream’ but a 
particular cross section of the white middle classes. In this, it is the American mirror image of many European 
parties and movements of the populist radical right which share the Tea Party’s anti-establishment message, its 
ultra-patriotism and ethnocentrism. It also shares some of its characteristics with the Christian Right with 
which it competes and cooperates when aiming at influencing the Republican Party and Washington while 
marking the merger of the Christian Right with Southern conservatism. 
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1. Introduction 
“Keep your government hands off my Medicare!” 
(at a town hall meeting in South Carolina, quoted in Zernike 2011a, p. 135) 
 
After more than one and a half years of its existence and unmistakable presence in 
American politics, and of its accompanying scrutiny, the Tea Party movement remains a 
deeply ambivalent phenomenon. Ambivalent in terms of its independence as a movement 
or and its relationship to the Republican party, conservative business elites, or right-wing 
media; ambivalent in terms of its message, the kind of change it advocates in explicit de-
marcation from the change its adherents attribute to President Obama; ambivalent about 
its social base as a true grass-roots or an elite-driven network of organizations and activ-
ists, a middle class or cross-class movement (see Rahe 2011; Rasmussen/Schoen 2010; 
Williamson et al. 2011). It has been credited with a number of things – as well as being 
denied such credit: as being a veto player (within the Congressional veto player, i.e. the 
House Republicans) which prevented a sensible solution to the deficit and debt crisis in 
the summer of 2011 (see article by Lynn in this issue), or as being just a “phantom” at the 
debt limit opera (see Zernike 2011b); as “fundamentally remaking” the entire American 
party system (Rasmussen/Schoen 2010) or as re-doing the Republican party (Rahe 2011); 
as the driving force behind the recapture of the House by the Republicans in November 
284 Michael Minkenberg 
2010 (Bromwich in: Dworkin et al. 2010) or as not much more than a rattling noise which 
will pass away soon (Brooks 2010). More generally, it has been characterized as a popu-
list anti-government revolt and, alternatively, as a reincarnation of American conserva-
tism, as something principally new, or as the renewal of long-standing right-wing tradi-
tions in line with Pat Buchanan, George Wallace, Barry Goldwater, Joseph Mc Carthy, 
and others (Rahe 2011; Rasmussen/Schoen 2010; Williamson/Skocpol/Cottin 2011; 
Zernike 2011a). 
This article takes a closer look at the Tea Party not by simply interpreting it in the 
context of American politics and history but by adding a transatlantic perspective. Its aim 
is to show that the Tea Party is a genuine right-wing movement with strong affinities to 
the Republican Party (rather than being independent or bi-partisan) which revives particu-
lar American traditions of conservatism and the radical right. Its support base is not ‘the 
mainstream’, as its sympathizers suggest (see Rasmussen/Schoen 2010), but a particular 
cross section of the white middle classes. In this, it is the American mirror image of many 
European parties and movements of the populist radical right which share the Tea Party’s 
anti-establishment message, its ultra-patriotism and ethnocentrism, its particular look at 
and instrumentalization of the past – though not its decentralized organizational charac-
teristics. It shares some of its characteristics with another very American movement, the 
Christian Right with which it competes and cooperates when aiming at influencing the 
Republican Party and Washington – in the tradition of the New Right of the 1970s and 
the conservative revolution of the 1980s (see Minkenberg 1990, 2003; also Hertzke 1993; 
Berlet/Lyons 2000). 
2. Comparative Reflections on Populism and the Radical Right – A 
Transatlantic View 
Studies of right-wing populism or the radical right usually constrain themselves to either 
side of the Atlantic, thereby implicitly subscribing to or explicitly affirming the paradigm 
of American exceptionalism. Only a few publications, usually edited volumes, try a trans-
atlantic or even global approach to these phenomena (see Betz/Immerfall 1998; Kap-
lan/Weinberg 1998; Minkenberg 1998; Taggart 2000; Faber/Unger 2008). But compara-
tivists since Aristotle know that the exceptional can only be exposed by comparing (for a 
felicitous example, see Lipset 1996). Hence, even a quintessentially American movement 
such as the Tea Party might be understood by comparing it and putting it into context. In 
the following, this context will be historical (comparisons with previous incarnations of 
populism in the US) and contemporary (comparisons with European equivalents). But 
first, a few conceptual words are in order. 
Definitions about the radical, populist or other right abound, usually by identifying 
some criteria which are deemed essential aspects. In the 1990s, when the radical right in 
Europe was on the rise, Cas Mudde calculated that in the literature on these parties, there 
were 26 different approaches of definition which included at least 58 different criteria, 
and later he attributes the “terminological chaos” to a lack of a clear and operational defi-
nition in most accounts (Mudde 1996: 229; idem 2007: 11-20). For the Tea Party which is 
often treated as a phenomenon sui generis, this definitional exercise (or lack thereof) is 
substituted by an exercise of characterization (populist, conservative, middle-class etc.) 
which, in turn, rests on largely implicit definitional assumptions. For example, when Paul 
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Rahe (2010) characterizes the Tea Party by pitting “ordinary citizens” and their “up-
heaval” against “the elites” and “the tyrannical impulse underpinning the administrative 
state”, and by invoking Madison’s warning of the dangers resulting from an absence of 
“popular checks” against a national government running out of control (“the Progressives 
and their heirs – the proponents of the New Deal, the Great Society, and Barack Obama’s 
New Foundation”, ibid., p. 17), he does nothing else than introducing a (vague) concept 
of populism (the common people against the establishment) to classify the Tea Party as 
an example of a more general phenomenon, i.e. anti-statist protest American style, or 
Madisonian democracy.1 
In the US debate, the concept of populism is rather widespread though typically un-
derstood as a genuinely, hence specifically American concept. Michael Kazin in his his-
tory of American populism traces the term and concept back to the historical movement 
of Populism in the 1890s and its subsequent transitions and sees populism mainly as “a 
persistent yet mutable style of political rhetoric with roots deep in the nineteenth century” 
(Kazin 1995: 5). Others like Margaret Canovan stress the ideological components such as 
a political programme organized around anti-elitism and an appeal to ‘the people’ to jus-
tify criticism of representative democracy (see Canovan 1981: 289-294; also Berlet/ Ly-
ons 2000: 4-13). Often, variations of populism such as left-wing and right-wing, agrarian 
and political are constructed to add nuance. Nonetheless, in his succinct but exhaustive 
overview of various versions of populism and the respective literature, Paul Taggart 
summarizes: “populism is a reaction against the ideas, institutions and practices of repre-
sentative politics which celebrates an implicit or explicit heartland as a response to a 
sense of crisis; however, lacking universal key values, it is chameleonic, taking on attrib-
utes of its environment, and, in practice, is episodic” (Taggart 2000: 5). 
According to this characterization, populism is more a political style and impulse 
(Taggart calls it “anti-political, empty-hearted”, ibid.) rather than a political program. As 
such, it connects well with all political movements which are directed against representa-
tive politics, mostly found on the political right in many Western democracies. In fact, 
many current definitions of the radical right focus on the combination of an anti-elite and 
anti-representational thrust and the populist style and rhetoric, aimed at mobilizing ‘the 
people’ against ‘the system’ or ‘the state’, often adding a particular nationalistic or xeno-
phobic message to the concept and pointing out the contextual factor of a crisis, real or 
imagined. For example, Hans-Georg Betz in an early comparative work on the subject de-
fines radical right-wing populism according to three ‘supply-side’ criteria: a) a critique of 
the welfare state, b) the refusal to integrate marginal groups in society, and c) a populist 
rhetoric (Betz 1994: 4). He argues that in the current phase of postindustrial capitalism, 
traditional political and social attachments are dissolved and both losers and winners of 
this process, i.e. unemployed and young entrepreneurs, vote, for different reasons, for 
parties of the radical right. With this broad definition Betz includes among the radical 
right very diverse phenomena, such as nationalist-authoritarian parties like the German ‘Re-
publikaner’ and the Belgian ‘Vlaams Blok’ (now ‘Vlaams Belang’), and more economically 
liberal, anti-tax parties such as the Scandinavian Progress Parties. Similarly, Mudde’s con-
cept of the populist radical right postulates as a definitional minimum nationalism and/or na-
tivism and adds aspects of xenophobia, a strong state and welfare chauvinism as core ideo-
logical features in an expanded definition (see Mudde 2007: 15-23).  
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3. The Message and the Messenger – a Look at the Supply Side 
Given the widespread definitions of populism, it is no big task to pigeonhole the Tea 
Party as the latest reincarnation of American populism (see Rasmussen/Schoen 2010; 
Zernike 2011a). However, a second look reveals that it is a very special brand of popu-
lism which puts the Tea Party closer to the European radical right than to the 19th century 
version of American populism. First, its anti-elitism and its frequent attacks on big gov-
ernment, big spending, ‘Obamacare’ etc. should not be confused with a principled rejec-
tion of the state. On the one hand, a typical Tea Party statement clearly opposes ‘big gov-
ernment’, as a participant put it in a focus group study: “I don’t want big government… I 
want the people to have the say-so” (quoted in Zernike 2011a: 153; see also King, in this 
issue). More specifically, it has been observed numerous times that on the one hand, the 
Tea Party questions all the federal approaches to problem solving in economic and social 
matters, from the New Deal on (see Rahe 2011; a telling rundown of Tea Party themes in 
Rasmussen/Schoen 2010: chap. 4). On the other hand, the Tea Party is not willing to dis-
mantle government programs like Medicare or the US military which both are among the 
major spending units in the federal budget (see Zernike 2011a: 135).2 Moreover, the Tea 
Party’s opposition to government spending (or its “spreading the wealth around”) is 
voiced by many who benefit from Medicare, Social Security or disability payments (see 
Williamson et al. 2011: 32)3. Behind the Tea Party’s anti-statism and anti-elitism does not 
lurk the elimination of state and elites, and an Athenian-style grass roots democracy but 
rather a different state and different elite. This echoes a familiar theme in US populism: it 
is liberal elites, and a Democratic government, more than elites and the state in general, 
which are the targets of criticism. Already in the early 1980s, Richard Viguerie, one of 
the masterminds of the 1970s New Right which helped Ronald Reagan and the Republi-
cans into power, published a book titled “The Establishment vs. the People” (1983) in 
which he massively criticized “the establishment” and celebrated the founding fathers. 
Upon closer inspection, he disclosed that he did not want to do away with the establish-
ment as such but with the liberal establishment in Congress, the media, the professions 
and so-called “interest group liberalism” (see Minkenberg 1990: 131).4  
Here, the Tea Party links up with anti-establishment rhetoric of both other right-wing 
movements in the United States, such as the 1970s New Right and its religious offspring 
and ally, the Christian Right, and significant parts of the European radical right (see 
Minkenberg 1998: 142-149). The Christian Right’s critique of Congress, partisan politics 
and the federal courts went hand in hand with a statist philosophy which wanted to 
strengthen the executive (for example with the line item veto for the President), a strong 
administration as far as law and order were concerned, and even the acceptance of the 
welfare state as far as it remained largely in the hands of the states (see Lowi 1995: 197-
208). In Europe, the radical right frequently attacks the established parties, parliament 
and the political elites, the mainstream media and the professions – and supports 
strengthening of the executive (e.g. in Germany: direct elections of the President, in 
France: the disempowerment of the parliament and cabinet) (see Minkenberg 1998: chap. 
7; Mudde 2007: chap. 6). In sum, despite the specific situational context of the US gov-
ernment bailout of American banks and industries in the transition of the Bush to the 
Obama administration in which the Tea Party emerged, despite the heavy emphasis on 
taxes and the deficit, Tea Party populism ties in with that of other right-wing movements 
and parties on both sides of the Atlantic in the attack on the institutions and practices of 
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representative democracy. However, as far as the literature shows, they are less specific 
than the Christian Right or the European radical right when it comes to concepts which 
should substitute these institutions and practices (see Zernike 2011a).  
One European group of radical right-wing politics deserves particular attention in this 
regard: the Danish and Norwegian Progress parties of the 1970s which attracted a consid-
erable following by attacking their countries’ tax systems; the Italian Lega Nord which 
equally criticized the country’s use of tax money for government projects in the South 
and Italian state centralism in general; and the Austrian Freedom Party under Haider 
which pursued a similar strategy (see Betz 1994: 4-13). What these parties had in com-
mon was the focus on national policies of taxing and spending, an attack on undeserving 
beneficiaries of tax money, and calls for a dismantling of ‘big government’ – themes that 
echo American right-wing populist movements. What they also had in common was a 
slow but persistent readjustment of their main message over time, from their primarily 
anti-government anti-tax positions to a growing emphasis on immigration and xenopho-
bia. In the end, the free market liberalism gave way to ‘welfare chauvinism’ and support 
for a vigorous state in the interest of the nation and nationalism, with principles of a ‘fair 
market economy’ rather than a ‘free market economy’, i.e. an economic program which is 
a peculiar mix of liberalism and socialism, and a strong dose of xenophobia which targets 
both particular migrant groups from other parts of the country and immigrants from 
abroad, most notably non-European immigrants (see Minkenberg 2000; also Mudde 2007: 
122-132). Is this a likely trajectory of the Tea Party movement as well? Will it revitalize 
Buchanan-style populism of the 1990s? 
Journalistic impressions and social science research indicate in fact a tendency to-
wards an exclusionary patriotism among the Tea Party, the extreme end of which is repre-
sented by the so-called ‘birthers’, those who claim that President Obama was not born an 
American citizen and hence took over the White House illegitimately (see Rasmussen/ 
Schoen 2010: 194-197; Zernike 2011a: 95-98). Observers generally agree that Tea Party 
organizers try to separate the movement from “fringe elements” (Rasmussen/Schoen 
2010: 167) and try to avoid “divisive social issues” such as abortion or school prayer (see 
Zernike 2011a: 96, 104; 143f.). However, as one analyst remarked, “for a movement that 
does not want to talk about social issues, the Tea Party talks an awful lot about them”.5 
The support for and by public figures, such as Tea Party backed Republican candidates in 
the 2010 Congressional elections or media personalities like Glenn Beck, Rush Lim-
baugh, Sarah Palin and others, reveals the strong current of social conservatism running 
underneath the officially proclaimed fiscal and economic platform (see, for example, 
Rasmussen/Schoen 2010: 184-197; Zernike 2011a: 92-98; Karpowitz et al., 2011). And 
there are numerous accounts of the tendency to raise the flag along with social issues: 
calls by Tea Party Patriots, an umbrella organization of more than 2,000 local Tea Party 
groups, to ask Congress to enact “an official language of the United States” (see William-
son et al. 2011: 28; Zernike 2011a: 143f.); patriotic singing and prayers which frequently 
turn “folksy piety and patriotism … into crude nativism, conspiracy theory, and xenopho-
bia” (Raban 2010: 5; see also Lepore 2011: 99). These examples indicate a strong sense 
of patriotism which borders on xenophobia. In fact, while explicit racism is clearly re-
jected by most Tea Partiers, a more subtle version of ‘othering’ seems to run through the 
movement. There is strong opposition to President Obama as shown by a large majority 
of Tea Partiers who doubt Obama’s nationality and a tendency of “racial neo-liberalism” 
in the Tea Party’s criticism of Obama and the Democratic Party (see Enck-Walzer 2011: 
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24f.; Williamson et al. 2011: 34; see also below). Distrust of politicians is coupled with 
fear of immigrants and desire for stronger border control; and opposition to government 
spending for the poor and the national health insurance are inacceptable because the re-
cipients are not seen as deserving. Here, the difference between the deserving, and the 
undeserving, the working poor and the non-working poor turns out to be “a cultural cate-
gory rather than a straightforward definition” (Williamson et al. 2011: 33). 
This is reinforced by the official distancing from the Christian Right and avoidance of 
social issues, while at the same time invoking religion and assuming the United States to 
have been founded as a Christian nation in an a-historical fashion (see Lepore 2011: 126-
129). Again, this coding strongly resembles the European radical right’s concern with 
immigrants who undeservedly take away national resources, i.e. ‘welfare chauvinism’ 
(see above and Betz 1994: 170-184; Mudde 2007: 130-132). Finally, the Tea Party’s par-
ticular approach to appropriating American history by emphasizing the superiority of the 
ideas and institutions of the Founding Fathers (see also footnote 2), by calling upon 
Americans to return to the original meaning of the Constitution (so-called ‘originalism’) 
while at the same time exercising a relatively liberal handling of historical facts (the 
overemphasis on the Christian roots of the American revolution, or the disregard for the 
race issue at the founding of the United States) displays the high level of politics and in-
strumentalization of the past in the Tea Party movement (see Lepore 2011). The propen-
sity to “historical simplism” (Lipset/Raab 1978: 8), the tendency to mythologize a coun-
try’s past is common to most ultranationalist and right-wing movements and ideologies 
(see Minkenberg 2000; also Lipset/Raab 1978) and serves as a powerful weapon in dis-
crediting political opponents. This becomes even clearer when looking at the demand side 
of the phenomenon. 
4. Crises and Chauvinists – a Look at the Demand Side 
On the ‘demand side’, key analytical concepts of right-wing populism and the radical 
right are often tied to a context of crisis, more particularly intense social and cultural 
change (see Minkenberg, 1998: chap. 1; 2000). Following earlier work by Theodore W. 
Adorno et al. (1969), Seymour M. Lipset (1960), and German sociologists Erwin Scheuch 
and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (1967) one can assume that the potential for radical right-
wing movements exists in all industrial societies and should be understood as a 'normal 
pathological' condition. In all fast-growing modernizing countries there are people who 
cannot cope with economic and cultural developments and who react to the pressures of 
readjustment with rigidity and closed-mindedness. These reactions can be mobilized by 
right-wing movements or parties offering political philosophies that promise an elimina-
tion of pressures and a simpler, better society (see Lipset/Raab 1978: 4-17). These phi-
losophies do not contain just any thinkable utopia but usually a romanticized version of 
the nation before the first large wave of modernization. That is, like Ernst Bloch in his 
analysis of National Socialism in 1932 (Bloch 1962; here pp. 104-160), Scheuch and 
Klingemann postulate that the core of the problem consists of a specifically a-
synchronous dealing with the past, especially a dissent about the evaluation of modernity 
in the respective societies. 
It is such a social and cultural modernization shift following the 1960s which led to a 
renewal of the radical right in various Western democracies and to the emergence of new 
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actors and agendas. This shift has been conceptualized in numerous ways, such as ‘post-
industrialism’, ‘value change’, ‘late capitalism’, ‘the third modernity’ and so on (see 
Touraine 1969; Bell 1973; Beck 1986; Inglehart 1997, among others). In this shift to-
wards what can be summarily termed ‘post-modernity’, understood not as the opposite to 
modernity, but an increasingly reflexive process of modernization and a new, self-critical 
posture towards modernity, cultural orientations and competences (education, language, 
communication), a sharpened sense of crisis, and the primacy of the Lebenswelt (Haber-
mas) assume a central role. The process can be read as a new phase of individualization 
and pluralization, along with a de-emphasis of authority, both religious and rational-legal 
in the Weberian sense (see Inglehart 1997). 
Beginning in the 1960s, the United States experienced a rapid modernization shift 
which included a massive cultural and political liberalization in terms of the intensified 
separation of church and state and, legalization of abortion, the rise of the women’s 
movement, the success of the civil rights movement, and political reforms in the wake of 
the student protests (see Mickelthwait/Wooldridge 2004: 64-68). Among the most promi-
nent groups which formed then were those of the New Right and Christian Right (see 
Minkenberg 1990, 2000; Williams 2010; Rozell 2011). In the language of social move-
ment research, the Christian Right organizations, most notably Moral Majority and Chris-
tian Coalition, operated as organizational foci in a network of networks of many single is-
sue movements and helped mobilize and politicize protestant fundamentalists. This 
movement is inspired by a literal understanding of the Bible, in the vein of religious fun-
damentalism, sees the United States as a Christian nation and advocates a political plat-
form, which, in the words of American political scientist Theodore Lowi, can be charac-
terized as “a combination of the Bible and Edmund Burke” (1996: 6). Over the years, the 
Christian Right applied a strategy not unlike that of the European New Right in the 
1970s, that is of mimicking the Left and applying a culture war or ‘Gramscism from the 
Right’ in order to establish a cultural hegemony before winning offices (see Minkenberg 
1998: 141-166, 252-259; also Lo 1982; Lind 1996; Pfahl-Traughber 2004). With this ap-
proach, it succeeded if not in taking over key institutions of the United States, then at 
least large parts of the Republican Party (see Minkenberg 2003; Rozell 2011). In the 
1990s, another radical right-wing group, the Pat Buchanan movement, appeared and built 
a new bridge between the Republican Party and the Christian Right. Buchanan’s ethno-
centrist ‘America First’ platform merged rather smoothly with the cultural nationalism of 
the Christian Right into American nativism: both wanted to preserve the ‘European core’ 
of the United States, both appealed to a similar audience in the 1990s, and both played a 
prominent role at the Republican convention of 1992 (see Lind 1995: 245-247; Minken-
berg 1998: 343-346; also Williams 2010: 231). 
Against this backdrop, the Tea Party continues certain traditions of the American 
conservative movement since Goldwater which has fundamentally transformed the Re-
publican Party (see Micklethwait/Wooldridge 2004; Peele 2011) while connecting them 
to the recent crisis of 2008 and after. Beyond the well-known tenets of populism and pa-
triotism, the opposition to liberal elites, politics and ‘big government’, and the insistence 
on the religious nature of the American nation, ethnic markers appear, brought out by the 
Obama Presidency: “the ideology of grassroots Tea Party adherents fits with long-
standing, well-documented connections between opposition to federal entitlement pro-
grams and espousal of racial stereotypes. This helps us situate this variant of populist 
mobilization in the broader history of post 1960s conservatism” (Williamson et al. 2011: 
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35). Indeed, numerous observers confirm the return of Goldwater references at Tea Party 
events or the logic of Goldwater conservatism (ibid., and Zernike 2011a: 52-60). 
In the election year of 2010, a series of Gallup polls6 reported that the Tea Party rank 
and file constituted about a quarter of the American public (18% in the New York 
Times/CBS News Poll of April 2010, see Zernike 2011a: 218; for the following, see ibid., 
pp. 195-227). They are 89% white and 1% black (all respondents: 77% and 12% respec-
tively), and have an above average degree of education (33% have some college, and 
23% some college, as opposed to all respondents with 28% and 15% respectively). But 
they are wealthier than the average American in all income brackets except for the lowest 
two, and not just the top brackets. In their age structure, they clearly diverge from the 
overall population: only 7% are younger than 30 years (compared to 23% overall), 46% 
are between 45 and 64 years (compared to 34%) and 29% are over 64 years (16%). 
At the same time, the Tea Party supporters do not differ much from the followers of 
the Christian Right some decades earlier, with the possible exception of their education 
levels (see Wilcox/Larson 2006: 51-159). They practice religion more regularly than av-
erage Americans (50% and 35%, respectively, attend church every week or almost every 
week) and they exhibit a larger share of self-declared born-again Christians (39%) than 
the average Americans (28%) (Zernike 2011a: 225). Like adherents to the Christian 
Right, Tea Party supporters are clearly partisan: 54% of them consider themselves Repub-
licans, only 5% Democrats, and the 36% of ‘independent’ Tea Party supporters include 
also Republican and Democratic ‘leaners’ who do not differ much from Republican and 
Democratic identifiers – hence it is realistic to assume that about three quarters of Tea 
Partiers are Republicans (see Williamson et al. 2011: 27). More precisely they are conserva-
tive Republicans, as the 73% who think of themselves as somewhat or very conservative in-
dicate (Zernike 2011a: 226). Among current political figures which Tea Party supporters 
admire most, Newt Gingrich, Sarah Palin, George W. Bush and Mitt Romney top the list 
(57% of them have a favorable view of the former president, 66% of Sarah Palin, ibid. pp. 
207f.). These findings are reinforced by reports that many Christian Right activists joined 
Tea Party groups (Rozell 2011: 127) – although it may be too early to determine whether the 
Christian Right is in the process of taking over the Tea Party movement. 
The congruence between Tea Partyism and Republican conservatism Goldwater-, 
Buchanan- or early Christian Right-style is also highlighted by the role of the Tea Party 
in the 2010 midterm elections. Generally, the Tea Party is credited with contributing to 
the defeat of a number of Democrats (including incumbents) by conservative Republi-
cans, such as Scott Brown in an early Senate election in Massachusetts, Ron Johnson in 
the Wisconsin and Rand Paul in the Kentucky Senate races.7 In-depth analyses reveal 
only modest effects by Tea Party organizations; only endorsements by Freedom Works 
led to a significant increase in the vote share for a Republican candidate in the general 
election (see Karpowitz et al., 2011). However, the movement was clearly decisive in a 
number of Republican primaries. As a correlation analysis shows, “candidates endorsed 
by the Tea Party Express and Sarah Palin garnered approximately 8–9 percentages points 
more than candidates who did not receive an endorsement. Candidates who adopted the 
Tea Party label themselves by signing the Contract from America did even better, with 
their vote shares increasing by more than 20 points” (ibid., p. 306). In other words, Tea 
Party endorsement or self-endorsement improved the chances of a candidate to win the 
Republican nomination, and these candidates were typically of a very conservative per-
suasion and figured as insurgents challenging candidates backed by the party establish-
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ment. As a result, Congress after the 2010 elections is more conservative and more polar-
ized than ever before (see Abramowitz 2011). This echoes the role of the Christian Right 
in the 1994 elections which did not only produce Republican domination of the 104th 
Congress but a substantially more conservative Republican Party than before (see Green 
et al. 1995; Minkenberg 1996: 148-150). 
Similar to previous right-wing movements, Tea Party supporters can be interpreted as 
the new ‘modernization losers’ in the wake of the crisis – an explanation which has also 
been employed for many of the European radical right supporters (see Lipset/Raab 1978; 
Minkenberg 2000). However, all ‘objectifying’ interpretations, which postulate a direct 
relationship between social and economic change and individual political behavior, must 
be treated carefully. For they neglect the dimension of political mediation and the subjec-
tive perception of the problems involved – or to speak with Berger and Luckmann, they 
overlook that a social and political construction of reality is involved. Various empirical 
studies showed that neither the actual level of unemployment nor the immediate presence 
or influx of immigrants correlate with a growth in right-wing attitudes or voting behavior 
(see e.g. Mudde 2007: 201-231). Here, it might be useful to remember Ernst Bloch's 
paradigm of a dual, i.e. objective and subjective, ‘dis-simultaneousness’ (see above).  
Therefore, supporters of right-wing populism and the radical right today should be in-
terpreted as ‘modernization losers’ in a subjective sense. These are primarily not victims 
of a process of social pauperization, like the working class in late 19th century or today’s 
unemployed, but ‘losers’ in a process of a differentiation of life chances. In post-modern 
society, where social and cultural capital is increasingly important, theirs is shrinking and 
they are intend on defending it against encroachments on their traditional entitlements. In 
this sense, they have been characterized as ‘welfare chauvinists’ (see above). This does 
not preclude at all an ideological component. Instead of a diffuse unease with post-
modernity which might befall many, supporters of these movements are characterized by 
a mix of this unease, rigid thinking, authoritarian attitudes and traditional values – all of 
which reinforce each other (see Lipset/Raab 1978; Spier 2010). 
For the United States, public opinion surveys demonstrate that adherents to the Moral 
Majority or Christian Coalition or Pat Robertson's and Pat Buchanan’s voters were not 
simply dissatisfied voters who protest by sending a message to their party. They differ 
from both the general electorate and other ‘protest voters’ such as Ross Perot’s by their 
distinct ideological orientations (see Minkenberg 1998: 315-323). These reflect the large 
share of protestant fundamentalists among them. In socio-structural terms, they were 
rather working class and lower middle class with low to medium levels of formal educa-
tion and a large concentration in the Southern states. But more than social characteristics, 
it was value orientations, traditional religiosity and an opposition to a pluralization of life 
styles which determine their political attitudes and behavior.  
Survey data evidence (for the following see the New York Times/CBS Poll in Zernike 
2011a: 195-227) suggest the supporters of the Tea Party share these characteristics of 
‘subjective modernization losers’. They are united by the feeling that the United States 
are generally going in the wrong direction (92%, compared to 59% of all respondents), 
and their primary emotional reaction to politics in Washington is not dissatisfaction 
(41%, compared to 48% of all respondents) but “anger” (53%, compared to 19%; see 
ibid., p. 204). Clearly, the economy is seen by them as the most important problem facing 
the country – but in that they do not differ from the rest of the country (23% and 23%, re-
spectively). A difference emerges when it comes to who is mostly to blame for the eco-
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nomic situation: only 5% of Tea Party supporters blame the Bush administration (32% of 
all respondents) but 10% the Obama administration (4%). The number one culprit for 
them, however, is Congress (28%, compared to 10% of all respondents). This may yet be 
another indicator of right-wing populists’ distrust of institutions of representative gov-
ernment, in particular parliament, as discussed earlier – and is fully in line with previous 
movements such as the Christian Right or the Wallace movement. However, in the case 
of the Tea Party, another dimension which is related to the current president assumes 
prominence: a strong rejection of Barack Obama whom Tea Partiers deeply distrust. Only 
20% of them believe he shares the values of most Americans (57% overall); 92% of them 
think Obama is moving the country towards socialism (52% overall). Moreover, only 
41% (compared to 58% overall) think he was born in the United States, that is almost two 
thirds of the Tea Partiers see in him an illegitimate president. Similar discrepancies be-
tween the beliefs of Tea Party supporters and the American public in general can be seen 
with regard to the issues of illegal immigration, problems facing black people, global 
warming, same-sex marriage, abortion and gun control, with Tea Partiers being decidedly 
more conservative. Yet at the same time, 84% of Tea Party supporters think their views 
reflect the views of most Americans (compared to 25% overall). While these data do not 
suggest that Tea Party supporters are an ideologically uniform bloc they demonstrate an 
identifiable pattern: Tea Partiers tend to have a very particular view of the country, its 
problems and its president which is more radical and right-wing, especially more anti-
Obama and socially conservative and in some instances more out of touch with reality, 
than that of the average American (see also Lepore 2010; Williamson et al. 2011: 32-34). 
Some interpret it as a distinctly “Southern ideological conservatism”, with racist connota-
tions (King, in this issue; see also Lind 1996, pp. 123-133). This puts it in line with 
Goldwater and Wallace, and their followers. And like these, the Tea Party and its leaders 
exhibit traces of “heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspirational fantasy”, that is 
the “angry mind” of the “paranoid style”, as defined famously by Richard Hofstadter: 
“the clinical paranoid sees the hostile and conspirational world in which he finds himself 
to be living as directed specifically against him; whereas the spokesman of the paranoid 
style finds it directed against a nation, a culture, a way of life whose fate affects not him-
self alone but millions of others… His sense that his political passions are unselfish and 
patriotic, in fact, goes far to intensify his feeling of righteousness and his moral indigna-
tion” (Hofstadter 1965: 3-4, emphasis in the original; see also Lipset/Raab 1978: 12-17; 
Williamson et al., 2011: 35). 
5. Conclusion 
The Tea Party movement stands in the tradition of many right-wing populist movements 
in American history – and is also comparable to its European counterpart, the contempo-
rary radical right, if not in the programmatic package it offers then in its welfare chauvin-
ist and anti-parliamentary thrust, its populist style, and key characteristics of its support 
base. Rather than being a populist anti-government revolt and far from an independent 
movement, the Tea Party is the continuation of a long-standing post-war right-wing tradi-
tion, from Joseph McCarthy to Barry Goldwater, George Wallace, the Christian Right 
and Pat Buchanan. As such it is an expression of “backlash politics” (Lipset/Raab, 1978: 
29) in a dual way. First a ‘supply side’ backlash against a government and a president 
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who embody values and politics diametrically opposed to the particular utopia of Tea 
Party America. That is, behind the tax-and-spend rhetoric and anti-Obamaism of leaders 
and activists lurk social conservatism and even racist overtones. Examples include the 
popularity of Goldwater conservatism among Tea Partiers (he campaigned on the issue of 
states’ rights, i.e. the continuation of racial segregation in the South) or the role of the 
Koch family, of Birch Society fame (known for its conspiracy theories and homeland na-
tivism), in establishing one of the most important Tea Party organizations, Freedom Works 
(see Zernike 2011a: 35; also Micklethwait/Wooldridge 2004: 61; Lipset/Raab 1978: 248-
287). Like the Christian Right before, which played a marginal role in recent elections, the 
Tea Party has begun to take over the Republican Party and is credited with having had deci-
sive influence on the midterm elections in 2010. Considering the observation that Christian 
Right activists and social conservatives make up a large and assumedly increasing portion of 
Tea Party activists, it seems likely that a merger of Christian Right and the Tea Party will re-
sult in a re-birth of the former and a metamorphosis of the latter – thereby consolidating the 
cultural conservative current within the Republican Party. 
The second backlash occurs at the level of the ‘demand side’, or the supporters. Simi-
lar to their predecessors, supporters of the Tea Party movement are the current ‘moderni-
zation losers’ in the wake of a crisis (an explanation which has also been employed for 
many of the European radical right supporters). Their reaction to, and interpretation of, 
the financial crisis exposes a political outlook which is more than a sense of economic 
loss and a diffuse protest against Washington. It is a decidedly right-wing ideology which 
merges economic with social and cultural concerns, and it has deep roots in the American 
political culture: “… extreme rightist movements have been more indigenous to America 
[than leftist movements; M.M.] and have left more of a mark on its history” (Lipset/Raab 
1978: 3, emphasis in the original). Profound unease with the direction the country is 
headed under its first African-American president and anger at those who are seen as re-
sponsible for the economic and cultural downturn fuel a political style which has been 
characterized as ‘paranoid’ and has itself a long history in American politics: “The recur-
rence of the paranoid style over a long span of time and indifferent places suggests that a 
mentality disposed to see the world in the paranoid’s way may always be present in some 
considerable minority of the population. But the fact that movements employing the 
paranoid style are not constant but come in successive episodic waves suggests that the 
paranoid disposition is mobilized into action chiefly by social conflicts that involve ulti-
mate schemes of values and that bring fundamental fears and hatreds, rather than negotia-
ble interests, into political action. Catastrophe or the fear of catastrophe is most likely to 
elicit the syndrome of paranoid rhetoric.” (Hofstadter 1965: 39) The question arises 
which is the true catastrophe for the Tea Party movement: the financial meltdown in 2008 
and the deficit, or the election of Barack Obama.  
Notes 
 
1 Of course, Rahe’s is a vastly simplistic version of Madison’s idea of checks and balances with “popular 
checks” being only one type of a myriad of checks and balances; see article by Lynn, this issue, figures 1 
and 2. 
2 See also http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/breakdown (accessed August 22, 2011). 
3 The Tea Partyʼs opposition to big government and government spending goes hand in hand with the ac-
ceptance of big money. For example, Freedom Works, one of the key organizations in the movement, 
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evolved from a group underwritten by the wealthy and conservative Koch family (see Zernike 2011a: 35); 
another core groupe, Tea Party Express, likewise attracted big money which it spent in Republican prima-
ries (see Williamson et al. 2011: 28; also Zernike 2011a: 155). This earned the Tea Party the label “astro-
turf” which critics use to point out the influential role of wealthy conservative groups and lobby organiza-
tions in what claims to be a grass-roots movement. In that, the Tea Party continues the tradition of alli-
ances between big money and right-wing populism in America, from Henry Ford onwards (see Ber-
let/Lyons 2000). 
4 In an interview with the author in Washington DC in April 1986, Viguerie asserted: “I am not anti-
establishment per se … I have no problem with the establishment. It is this establishment that is working 
against the best interests of the people which concerns me. You take two hundred years ago, our country 
had a wonderful establishment” (in Minkenberg 1990: 148). It does not come as a surprise that today, 
Richard Viguerie supports the Tea Party movement as a promising reincarnation of American popu-
lism(see Rasmussen/Schoen 2010: 119, 196f.). 
5 Prof. Gabriel Hudson, George Mason University, at the panel “Sex, Gender, and the Tea Party”, APSA 
2011 Annual Meeting, Seattle, WA, Sep. 4, 2011. See also his paper at this panel “Civil Rights and 
LGBTQ Scapegoats in the Tea Party Movement”. 
6 See Jeffrey Jones, Americans see Positive, Negative Effects of Tea Party Movement, in: Gallup, Novem-
ber 4, 2010; http://www.gallup.com/poll/144242/americans-positive-negative-effects-tea-party-movement. 
aspx, (accessed Oct. 3, 2011). 
7 See ABC News, Which Tea Party Candidates Won? November 3, 2010; http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/ 
2010_Elections/vote-2010-elections-tea-party-winners-losers/story?id=12023076, (accessed October 3, 
2011); also Zernike 2011a: 86-92. 
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